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Chart v. General Motors Corp.: Did It
Chart the Way for Admission of Evidence
of Subsequent Remedial Measures
in Products Liability Actions?
On July 30, 1966, Penny Chart was seriously injured when the driver
of a 1963 Corvair automobile in which she was riding lost control of the
vehicle while rounding a curve. She subsequently brought suit to recover
for her injuries, naming a number of parties,' including General Motors
Corporation, the manufacturer of the Corvair, as defendants. Chart
claimed that the Corvair's suspension had been defectively designed 2 and
that the defect had caused the accident in which she was injured
During the six week trial, the court admitted, over the objections of
counsel for General Motors, evidence that GM had redesigned the
suspension of the 1964 and 1965 model Corvairs. In making their
unsuccessful objections, counsel for General Motors argued that
admission of the evidence violated Rule 904.07 of the Wisconsin Rules of
Evidence, which bars the admission of evidence of subsequent remedial
conduct offered "to prove negligence or culpable conduct., 4 The jury
!. Chart v. General Motors Corp., No. 8-331 (Cir. Ct. Vilas County, Wis. 1966). Chart also
brought suit against the driver of the Corvair (alleging negligent operation of the automobile), Villas
County (alleging negligent maintenance of the highway), and, in a separate action that was later
consolidated, two state highway department employees (alleging negligent placement of a highway sign
that was struck during the accident). Id. The owner of the automobile was laterjoined as a third-party
defendant. Chart v. General Motors Corp., 80 Wis. 2d 91, 97, 258 N.W.2d 680, 682 n.l (1977).
2. In its reply brief on appeal to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, General Motors argued that
plaintiff had tried the action, at least as it related to GM, on two theories: negligence and strict liability.
Reply Brief of Appellant at 7. The supreme court determined that the case had been tried on only a
strict liability theory, which it referred to as a defective design theory. See 80 Wis. 2d at 98, 99, 258
N.W.2d at 682, 683.
3. Specifically, Chart alleged that the Corvair's "swing axle" suspension tended to lift the rear of
the vehicle during cornering, causing it to "oversteer"-that is, cut a path sharper than that intended by
the driver. She further alleged that American drivers were not familiar with the swing axle suspension
or the resulting steering characteristics, and that these factors had caused the driver of the auto in which
she was riding to lose control. 80 Wis. 2d at 99, 258 N.W.2d at 683.
4. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 904.07 (West 1973), entitled "Subsequent remedial measures," provides as
follows (emphasis added):
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made
the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove
negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This section does not require the
exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as
proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or
impeachment or proving a violation of s. 101.11 [dealing with an employer's duty to furnish a
safe place of employment].
Although numbered as statutes, the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence were promulgated by the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin pursuant to the authority given it by Wis. STAT. ANN. § 751.12 (West
Spec. Pamphlet 1979). In promulgating the Rules, the supreme court expressly reserved the power to
.repeal, amend, modify, or otherwise amplify specific rules of evidence by individual decisions of this
court without following general rule-making procedures of this court." 59 Wis. 2d R2 (1973).
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returned a verdict of $777,674 for Penny Chart, apportioning twelve
percent of the liability to General Motors,6 and GM appealed to the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
On appeal, counsel for General Motors argued that the trial court had
committed error by admitting evidence of the redesign of the Corvair
suspension.8 The supreme court rejected this argument in an opinion
written by Justice Day and affirmed the trial court's entry of judgment
against GM. 9 Three members of the court dissented in an opinion written
by Justice Connor Hansen.' °
The issue addressed in Chart is particularly significant given the
current interest in products liability lawsuits. Most states" have adopted
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which permits
recovery for personal injury or property damage caused by a defective
product,1 2 and almost every products liability action contains an allegation
5. WIS. STAT. ANN § 895.045 (West 1966 & Supp. 1979) provides as follows:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal
representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or
property, if such negligence was not greater than the negligence of the person against whom
recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount
of negligence attributable to the person recovering.
6. The remaining liability was apportioned to the plaintiff(3%), the driver of the car (75%), Vilas
County (5%), and the two highway employees (5%). 80 Wis. 2d at 99,258 N.W.2d at 683. The trial judge
granted a motion forjudgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the state highway employees. Id.
at 99, 258 N.W.2d at 683.
7. Until August 1, 1978, Wisconsin had no intermediate appellate courts. Appeals from the
circuit courts, which had original jurisdiction over civil actions, were taken directly to the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin. In 1977, Wisconsin voters approved an amendment to the state constitution that
directed the legislature to establish intermediate courts of appeals. Wis. CONsT. art. VII § 2 (1848)
(amended 1977). The legislature reacted by enacting Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 808.01-.11,809.01-.85 (West
Supp. 1979), which created the intermediate appellate courts and established rules of procedure.
8. 80 Wis. 2d at 100, 258 N.W.2d at 683.
9. Id at 104, 114, 258 N.W.2d at 685, 689-90.
10. Id. at 114-21, 258 N.W.2d at 690-93.
1I. Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Products
Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 297,297 n.1 (1977). Wisconsin adopted strict products liability in
1967. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides (emphasis added):
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Of course, the elements of strict products liability differ from the elements of negligence. To
establish negligence a party must prove "(I) a duty to conform to a certain standard of conduct to
protect others against unreasonable risks; (2) a failure to conform to the required standard; (3) a causal
connection between the conduct and the injury; and (4) actual loss or damage as a result of the injury."
Thomas v. Kells, 53 Wis. 2d 141, 144, 191 N.W.2d 872, 873-74 (1971). See generally W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965).
The courts have had trouble defining the defectiveness that must be present to create liability
1980] SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES
that the product causing the plaintiff's injury was, in some way, defective.
Like Chart, many of these cases raise the question whether evidence of
subsequent remedial measures (especially changes in the design of a
product) is admissible to prove that a product was defective. 3 The Chart
court's holding that evidence of this type is admissible in strict products
liability actions is likely to be relied upon by countless plaintiffs (and jeered
by countless defendants) for many years to come.
This article proposes to describe and evaluate the holding and
reasoning of Chart. Parts I and II will describe the background against
which the case was decided. Specifically, Part I will discuss the theoretical
basis for the conventional rule that excludes evidence of subsequent
remedial measures when offered to prove negligence, and Part II will
examine the leading pre-Chart cases, focusing on the role of this
"exclusionary rule" in a strict products liability context. Part III will then
discuss the holding and reasoning of the Chart decision in detail. Finally,
Part IV will present the author's observations and suggestions concerning
the use of evidence of subsequent remedial measures in products liability
actions.
I. THE THEORETICAL BASES FOR
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
At common law, 14 and under both Federal Rule of Evidence 407 and
Wisconsin Rule of Evidence 904.07,15 evidence of measures taken to
under § 402A. Jagmin v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 61 Wis. 2d 60, 66, 211 N.W.2d 811, 813 (1973).
Defectiveness has been defined only on a case-by-case basis, and it has been noted that the term is not
susceptible of an all-encompassing definition. I R. HURSCH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4:12, at 670 (2d ed. 1970).
One definition that has been used is one by which "defectiveness" is measured by reference to
"consumer expectations." See Note, Strict Products Liability in Wisconsin, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 227,230:
"[Slection 402A, read in conjunction with the comments, clearly predicates liability upon the notion of
frustration of the ordinary consumer's expectations, a concept derived substantially from the law of
contracts." The consumer expectations test for § 402A defectiveness has posed many problems for the
courts, however. While Wisconsin, for example, ostensibly applies the consumer expectations test, one
commentator has noted that Wisconsin strict products liability law is in a state of considerable
confusion as a result of the Restatement's intermingling of tort and contract notions of liability. Id. at
230-35.
Deans Wade and Page Keeton have independently suggested that the consumer expectations test
be abandoned in favor of a test that considers whethera product was "unreasonably dangerous," which
is determined by balancing the magnitude of the risk of danger posed by the product against the utility
of the product. Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30,38 (1973);
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837 (1973).
13. For a general discussion of this issue, see Annot., 74 A.L.R.3d 1001 (1976).
14. See MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 275 (2d ed. Cleary 1972 & Supp.
1978) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]; 2 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM
OF EVIDENCE § 283 (3d ed. 1940 & Supp. 1979) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
15. FED. R. EvID. 407, entitled "Subsequent Remedial Measures," provides as follows:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made
the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove
negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not require the
exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as
proving ownership, control, or feasibility or precautionary measures, if controverted, or
impeachment.
The text of Wis. R. EVID. 904.07 is recited in note 4 supra. The Wisconsin Rule is substantially the same
as FED. R. EvID. 407.
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correct a defect or shortcoming is not admissible to prove that the
defendant was negligent. The evidence may, however, be admitted for
other purposes.
16
A. Justifications for Exclusion
Three arguments have been made to support the exclusion of evidence
of subsequent remedial measures: 17 (1) the evidence is not relevant to the
issue of negligence or, at least, is not sufficiently relevant to justify its
admission; (2) the admission of evidence of subsequent repairs would
discourage potential defendants from taking corrective measures; and (3)
notions of fair play would be offended if evidence of repair was admitted
against a person who, by effecting the repair, had done exactly what society
expected of him.
The first argument is premised upon the notion that evidence of
remedial conduct is "equally consistent with injury by mere accident or
contributory negligence" as with injury caused by the negligence of the
defendant.1 8 Those who subscribe to this theory argue that the evidence is
not sufficiently probative to outweigh the danger of misleading, confusing,
or unduly prejudicing the jury. For example, the Supreme Court of the
United States has observed that
the evidence is incompetent, because the taking of such precautions against
the future is not to be construed as an admission of responsibility for the past,
has no legitimate tendency to prove that the defendant had been negligent
before the accident happened, and is calculated to distract the minds of the
jury from the real issue, and to create prejudice against the defendant.'9
Justice Clark of the Supreme Court of California made a similar comment
in his dissent in Ault v. International Harvester Co., 20 a case that, like
Chart, dealt with the admissibility of evidence of subsequent repairs:
Change in a product is frequently made for reasons unrelated to the
16. See notes 4, 15 supra. See also section I(B) infra.
17. This rule is frequently referred to as the "exclusionary rule" or the "general exclusionary
rule." See, e.g., Note, Products Liability and Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, 1972 DUKE L.J. 837,840
[hereinafter cited as Evidence of Subsequent Repairs]; Comment, Ault v. International Harvester
Co.-Death Knell to the Exclusionary Rule Against Subsequent Remedial Conduct in Strict Products
Liability, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 208,209 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Death Knell to the Exclusionary
Rule]. In light of the many purposes for which evidence of remedial measures is admissible, see text
accompanying note 35 infra, the use of the term "general exclusionary rule" is questionable. Evidence
of Subsequent Repairs, supra at 845. This article will, accordingly, refer to the rule as simply the
"exclusionary rule."
18. FED. R. EVID. 407 (West 1975) (Advisory Committee's Notes). Baron Bramwell, in an often-
quoted remark from Hart v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry. Co., 21 L.T.R. (n.s.) 261, 263 (1869),
commented that the exclusionary rule rejects the notion that "because the world gets wiser as it gets
older, therefore it was foolish before."
19. Columbia & P. S. R. R. Co. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 207 (1892) (citations omitted).
Commentators have made similar arguments. See, e.g., G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 48, at 152 (1978); 2 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 164, at 241-42 (1978);
WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 283, at 151.
20. 13 Cal. 3d 113, 125-26, 528 P.2d 1148, 1156, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 820 (1974) (en banc) (Clark,
J., dissenting).
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remedial nature of the change. Among the motivations for change are the
desire to decrease production cost or to increase efficiency or salability. The
most striking illustration of lack of probative value is supplied by the
automobile industry. Each year hundreds of changes are made in a new
model. It is absurd to suggest that each change reflects an admission [that] the
modification was made to remedy a defect.
Notwithstanding the lack of probative value, juries, in the heat of
negligence or product liability trials-learning only of a single change-may
conclude the change reflects an admission of negligence or defect and may
give great and decisive weight to the perceived admission.
As some commentators have pointed out, evidence of subsequent
remedial measures may be relevant 2 because negligence is a possible
inference from the evidence. Moreover, the potential for jury abuse does
not support a blanket exclusion since, as Judge Weinstein has noted, rule
40323 (and its counterparts at the state level) would provide an adequate
basis for excluding evidence that is unduly prejudicial, likely to confuse the
jury, or merely cumulative.24
The second argument for the exclusion of evidence of subsequent
remedial measures has been summed up by the Supreme Court of Indiana:
The effect of declaring such evidence competent is to inform a defendant that
if he makes changes or repairs he does it under penalty; for, if the evidence is
competent, it operates as a confession that he was guilty of a prior
wrong. . . . True policy and sound reason require that men should be
encouraged to improve, or repair, and not be deterred from it by the fear that
if they do so their acts will be construed into an admission that they had been
wrong-doers. 5
Commentators have criticized this argument on a number of grounds.
First, they argue that there have been no empirical studies that verify the
accuracy of the assertion that potential defendants would make fewer
21. Relevancy is defined in FED. R. EVID. 401. "Relevant evidence means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence." See generally James, Relevancy,
Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 689 (1941); Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A
Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REV. 385 (1952).
22. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 407 (West 1979) (Advisory Committee's Notes); MCCORMICK,Supra
note 14, § 275, at 666; 2J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, VEINSTEIN's EvIDENCE 407[02], at407-08 to407-
09 (1979); WIG,1ORE, supra note 14, § 283, at 151.
23. FED. R. EvID. 403, entitled "Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice,
Confusion, or Waste ofTime," provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence."
24. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 22, 407[03] at 407-13. See also Note, The Repair
Rule: Maine Rule of Evidence 407(a) and the Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures in
Proving Negligence, 27 MAINE L. REv. 225, 240 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The Repair Rule]; Note,
Evidence of Subsequent Repairs: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 9 U. CAL. D. L. REV. 421,438-39
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Repairs: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow].
One could argue, however, that the exclusionary rule serves to "flag" the possibility of prejudice
and confusion, and that judges and counsel would forget about the problems within a short time if the
rule were abolished.
25. Terre Haute & Indianapolis R.R. v. Clem, 123 Ind. 15, 18-19, 23 N.E. 965, 966 (1890).
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repairs if evidence of those repairs were admissible.2 6 In addition, they
point out that most potential defendants, particularly manufacturers, have
a sufficient economic self-interest that they would take corrective measures
to avoid unfavorable publicity and consumer backlash regardless of the
admissibility of evidence of those measures.27 The commentators have also
noted that most potential defendants either do not know about the
exclusionary rule28 or, if they do, also know that there are a host of
exceptions that would permit the evidence to be admitted.29 Finally, most
commentators have pointed out that the use of liability insurance is
widespread, ° and that most insurance carriers advise their clients to take
remedial measures when a defect is found, even though evidence of the
changes might later be used to prove liability.3
The third argument for exclusion of the evidence-that admission
would offend fundamental notions of fair play-has been developed only
recently. The analysis is straightforward: "[P]eople who take post-accident
safety measures are doing exactly what good citizens should do. In these
circumstances, so long as the relevancy of the activity is not great, courts
do not wish to sanction procedures which appear to punish praiseworthy
behavior.
3 2
The "fairness" argument, as it is sometimes called, has drawn little
attention from critics of the exclusionary rule. However, the argument
would seem to be less persuasive when a corporate defendant is involved
since the public generally is not offended if "looser" standards of fairness
are applied to large corporations.
Critics have also questioned the premises on which the exclusionary
rule is based. The gist of all these contentions is that the values served by
exclusion-namely, preventing jury misuse, encouraging safety measures,
and preserving the appearance of fairness-do not warrant withholding
26. Schwartz, The Exclusionary Rule on Subsequent Repairs-A Rule in Need of Repair, 7
FORUM 1, 6 (1971); The Repair Rule, supra note 24 at 242. But see Death Knell to the Exclusionary
Rule, supra note 17, at 223; and Recent Developments, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 288, 291-92.
27. See, e.g., Field, The Maine Rules of Evidence: What They Are and How They Got That Way,
27 MAINE L. REV. 203, 218 (1975); Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, supra note 17, at 849. But see
Recent Developments, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 288, 291-92.
28. D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 19, § 164, at 240; Schwartz, supra note 26, at 6; J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 24, 407[02], at 407-10.
29. D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 19, § 164, at 240; S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN,
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 164 (2d ed. 1977); J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,supra note22,
407[02], at 407-10; Repairs: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, supra note 24, at 424 n.29.
30. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 29, at 168; Repairs: Yesterday, Today, and
Tomorrow, supra note 24, at 433-34.
31. Id. at 434; Davis, Evidence of Post-Accident Failures, Modifications and Design Changes in
Products Liability Litigation, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 792,798 (1975). But see S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN,
supra note 29, at 168-69.
32. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 29, at 164. See also D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER,
supra note 19, § 163, at 236, § 164, at 241; Death Knell to the Exclusionary Rule, supra note 17, at 223
n.68.
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relevant evidence from the trier of fact33 or increasing the difficulty of
establishing a case.34
B. Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule is riddled with exceptions,35 as Professor
McCormick has pointed out:
[E]vidence of subsequent repair or changes has been admitted as evidence of
the defendant's ownership or control of the premises or his duty to repair
where these are disputed; as evidence of the possibility or feasibility of
preventive measures, when properly in issue; as evidence, where the jury has
taken a view, or where the defendant has introduced a photograph of the
scene, to explain that the situation at the time of the accident was different; as
evidence of what was done later to show that the earlier condition as of the
time of the accident was as plaintiff claims, if the defendant disputes this; as
evidence that the faulty condition, later remedied, was the cause of the injury
by showing that after change the injurious effect disappeared; and, as
36
evidence contradicting facts testified to by the adversary's witness.
Wisconsin Rule of Evidence 904.07 codifies many of these exceptions.37
Although any number of exceptions may be important in a products
liability action, only one, the "feasibility" exception, was raised in Chart.38
The admission of evidence of subsequent repairs to prove feasibility has
traditionally been justified on two grounds. First, as Professors Louisell
and Mueller have pointed out, evidence of subsequent remedial measures
"has its highest and clearest probative value [when offered to prove
feasibility], and there is some virtue in a rule which admits proof in such
circumstances while focusing the attention of the trier of fact upon its
specific utility."3 9 Second, the proponents of the feasibility exception argue
that it would be unfair to preclude a plaintiff from showing that the
measures were later taken when the defendant has contended that all
possible care was exercised or that there were no alternatives available.4 °
These arguments are clearly problematic. The first argument may
33. Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, supra note 17, at 846; The Repair Rule, supra note 24, at
242.
34. Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, supra note 17, at 848; Recent Cases, 44 U. CINN. L. REV.
637, 641 (1975).
35. Actually, these "exceptions" are not exceptions at all, but instances of other probanda for
which evidence of subsequent remedial measures is admissible. These instances have traditionally been
referred to as "exceptions," see, e.g., Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, supra note 17, at 841, and this
article will adhere to the practice.
36. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 275, at 667-68 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
37. The text of Wis. R. EvID. 904.07 is recited in note 4 supra.
38. See Part III infra.
39. D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 19, § 165, at 251. See Falknor, Extrinsic Policies
Effecting Admissibility, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 574, 591 (1956); Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, supra
note 17, at 842 n.23. Evidence of feasibility is relevant to prove negligence since, in determining whether
the defendant exercised reasonable care, "[c]onsideration must also be given to any alternative course
open to the actor." PROSSER, supra note 12, § 31, at 148.
40. J.WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 22, 407[03], at 407-15.
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temper the fear that evidence of subsequent repairs tends to unduly
prejudice the jury, but it does not refute the contention that admission of
such evidence will deter corrective measures, nor does it address the
argument that use of the evidence is inherently unfair. The second
argument is equally problematic since the question of fairness is, at best, a
draw. While it may be unfair to prevent the plaintiff from introducing
evidence of subsequent repairs to contest the feasibility of a modification,
it would seem to be equally unfair, given the inflammatory nature of the
evidence, to allow it to be used against the defendant. Moreover, the
admission of the evidence, even for a limited purpose, tends to defeat the
nondeterence policy of the exclusionary rule: "Is it not true that to allow
exceptions to a policy of absolute exclusion is to destroy the policy
itself?" ' Finally, the possibility that ajury will give evidence of subsequent
repairs more weight than is warranted, even if a cautionary instruction is
given, exists even when the evidence is introduced for a limited purpose
rather than to prove negligence or culpable conduct.
Commentators have noted that the feasibility and other exceptions to
the exclusionary rule provide skillful counsel with an opportunity to take
advantage of his opponent through "subtle trial maneuvers" designed to
circumvent the rule.42 The commentators have also argued that admission
of evidence for a limited purpose unnecessarily confuses the jury,43 and
that a rule with numerous exceptions, like the exclusionary rule, makes it
difficult for attorneys to advise clients or plan trial strategy.44
In short, while there is no dearth of scholarly speculation regarding
the merits of the exclusionary rule, the theories concerning the rule arejust
that-speculation. In the absence of empirical data on which to base
observations and conclusions, all justifications for the rule are theoretical
and remain subject to debate.
II. THE ROLE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
IN A STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILIBY CONTEXT:
PRE-Chart CASES
Until recently, courts applied the exclusionary rule to strict products
liability actions as well as negligence actions with little question. For
example, in Price v. Buckingham Manufacturing Co.45 the Supreme Court
of New Jersey held that evidence of a modification in the design of a seat
belt was not admissible to prove that the belt was legally defective. The
41. Trautman, supra note 21, at 412.
42. See, e.g., D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 19, § 163, at 235-36, § 166, at 255; Slough,
Relevancy Unraveled-Part 1I: Remote and Prejudicial Evidence, 5 KAN. L. REv. 675, 709 (1957).
43. Repairs: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, supra note 24, at 426, 438. When evidence is
admitted for a limited purpose, the party against whom the evidence is admitted is entitled to a
cautionary instruction. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 901.06 (West 1975); FED. R. EVID. 105.
44. Repairs: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, supra note 24, at 438.
45. 110 N.J. Super. 462, 266 A.2d 140 (1970).
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court, in a brief opinion, stated that rule 51 of the New Jersey Rules of
Evidence 46 applied with equal force to strict products liability and
negligence actions,47 presumably on the ground that admission of the
evidence would deter product improvements.48
An Ohio appellate court has taken the same position, but has
embellished it with a significant exception:
In an action based upon strict liability in tort, evidence of subsequent
changes and changes in the "state of the art" are not admissible to show that
the item is defective. However, such evidence is admissible for the limited
purpose of showing that an alternative design was feasible at the time that the
item was manufactured or sold.49
This rule is, of course, similar to the rule typically applied in negligence
actions.50
While these and similar cases still represent the state of the law in
many jurisdictions, the number of courts5' and commentators 52 who favor
the general admission of evidence of subsequent remedial measures aimed
at proving the defectiveness of a product in strict products liability actions
is growing. The leading pre-Chart case supporting general admissibility-
and still a landmark decision in this area-is Ault v. International
Harvester Co.,53 a decision of the Supreme Court of California. In Ault,
46. N.J. R. EVID. 51 provides:
When after the occurrence of an event remedial or precautionary measures are taken,
which, if taken previously would have tended to make the event less likely to occur, evidence
of such subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in
connection with the event.
47. 110 NJ. Super. at464-65,266 A.2d at 141. See also Smythv. Upjohn Co., 529 F.2d 803 (2d
Cir. 1975) (diversity case applying New York law); Phillips v. J.L. Hudson Co., 79 Mich. App. 425,263
N.W.2d 3 (1977); cf. Haysom v. Coleman Lantern Co., 89 Wash. 2d 474,573 P.2d 785 (1978) (en bane)
(stating that, generally, evidence of subsequent repairs is inadmissible, but recognizing that such
evidence may be admitted to prove feasibility).
48. This is the conclusion reached by Professor Schwartz in his article, The Exclusionary Rule
on Subsequent Repairs-A Rule in Need of Repair, supra note 26, at 4 n.20.
49. La Monica v. Outboard Marine Corp., 48 Ohio App. 2d 43, 44-45, 355 N.E.2d 533, 535
(1976) (citation omitted). Other courts have adopted a similar rule. See, e.g., the frequently cited
Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 Ill. App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749 (1972).
50. See Part I supra.
51. See, e.g., Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788,793 (8th Cir. 1977);
Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113,528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812(1974) (en bane);
Shaffer v. Honeywell, Inc., 249 N.W.2d 251 (S.D. 1976); Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Nev. 408,470
P.2d 135 (1970). See also Barry v. Manglass, 55 A.D.2d 1, 389 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1976). But see Smyth v.
Upjohn Co., 529 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1975) (diversity case applying N.Y. law); Phillips v. J.L. Hudson
Co., 79 Mich. App. 425,263 N.W.2d 3 (1977); Haysom v. Coleman Lantern Co., 89 Wash. 2d 474, 573
P.2d 785 (1978).
52. See, e.g., Davis, Evidence of Post-Accident Failures, Modifications and Design Changes in
Products Liability Litigation, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 792 (1975); Lloyd, Admissibility of Evidence of Post-
Accident Repairs: The Graying of a Black Letter Rule, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 400 (1975); Schwartz, supra
note 26; Evidence of Subsequent Refpairs, supra note 17; Note, Repairs; Yesterday, Today, and
Tomorrow, supra note 24. See also L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUcTS LIABILITY § 12.04 (1978);
G. LILLY, supra note 19, at § 48; D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 19, at § 164; S. SALTZBURG &
K. REDDEN, supra note 29. But see Death Knell to the Exclusionary Rule, supra note 17; Recent
Developments, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 288.
53. 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974) (en bane).
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plaintiff, who had been seriously injured in an automobile accident,
brought an action against the manufacturer of the auto in which he was
riding, claiming negligence, defective design, and breach of warranty.14 At
trial, plaintiff attempted to prove that the vehicle was legally defective by
showing that the defendant-manufacturer, International Harvester, had
changed the design of its steering boxes (the part in question) three years
after the accident.5" The evidence was admitted, 6  and, after an
unfavorable verdict, International Harvester appealed, contending that
the evidence was not admissible under section 1151 of the California
Evidence Code. 7
The supreme court disagreed with defendant's contention and held
that the statute did not apply to strict products liability actions since proof
of "negligence or culpable conduct," the issues enumerated in the statute,
was not required.5 8 The court also pointed out that the policy justifications
for the exclusionary rule were inapplicable in the products liability area
because the manufacturer is motivated by economic self-interest to make
the product safer.59
The Ault case is important because it contains an extensive analysis of
the policy considerations behind the exclusionary rule60 and because it is
frequently cited by other courts as precedent.61 Justice Mosk, writing for
the majority, concluded that section 1151 on its face did not apply to strict
products liability actions since neither negligence nor culpability is an
element of strict liability. 62 In reaching this conclusion, Mosk, apparently
attempting to deal with any argument that might seek to exploit the term
"negligence," noted that "in the [strict] products liability field 'policy
considerations are involved which shift the emphasis from the manufac-
turer's conduct to the character of the products. , ,63 Mosk
54. Id. at 116, 528 P.2d at 1149, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
55. Id. at 117, 528 P.2d at 1150, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
56. Id.
57. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1151 (West 1966) provides: "When, after the occurrence of an event,
remedial or precautionary measures are taken, which, if taken previously, would have tended to make
the event less likely to occur, evidence of such subsequent measures is inadmissible to prove negligence
or culpable conduct in connection with the event."
58. 13 Cal. 3d at 117-18,528 P.2d at 1150-51, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814-15. Note that the California
rule, like the Wisconsin, New Jersey, and federal rules, bars admission of evidence of subsequent
remedial conduct to prove "culpable conduct" as well as negligence.
59. Id. at 120, 528 P.2d at 1151-52, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16.
60. See also Schuldies v. Service Mach. Co., 448 F. Supp. 1196 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Ginnis v.
Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Nev. 408, 470 P.2d 135 (1970).
61. A partial listing of these cases is in note 51 supra. Haysom v. Coleman Lantern Co., 89 Wash.
2d 474, 573 P.2d 785 (1978) (en banc), deserves special attention since, in that case, the Washington
Supreme Court held that evidence of subsequent repairs was not admissible to prove that a product was
defective. Id. at 483-84,573 P.2d at 790-91. Although the court agreed that the nondeterrence argument
lacked support in the products liability area, it nevertheless sustained the decision of the trial court on
the grounds that the potential for jury misuse was simply too great. Id. The court reserved judgment on
whether a trial court should be given discretion to admit the evidence. Id. at 484, 573 P.2d at 791.
62. 13 Cal. 3d at 118, 528 P.2d at 1150-51, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814-15.
63. Id. at 121, 528 P.2d at 1152, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 816 (citing Sutkowski v. Universal Marion
Corp., 5 Ill. App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749 (1972)
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specifically rejected International Harvester's argument that the "culpable
conduct" language of the rule was broad enough to encompass strict
products liability, explaining, in a conclusory fashion, that culpability
implies blameworthiness and that strict products liability is premised upon
the idea of liability without fault. 4 He also pointed out that the legislative
history of section 1151 indicated that the drafters had not intended the
statute to apply to actions based upon strict products liability.65 Instead, he
said, the section was "intended merely to codify 'well-settled law,' "which
dealt only with the admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial
16
measures in negligence actions.
Mosk then turned to an examination of the policy justifications for
excluding evidence of subsequent repairs, finding that the legislature
intended to "avoid deterring individuals from making improvements or
repairs after an accident has occurred. 6 7 He concluded that this factor did
not play a comparable role in the products liability area:
The contemporary corporate mass producer of goods, the normal
products liability defendant, manufactures tens of thousands of units of
goods; it is manifestly unrealistic to suggest that such a producer will forego
making improvements in its product, and risk innumerable additional
lawsuits and the attendant adverse effect upon its public image, simply
because evidence of adoption of such improvement may be admitted in an
action founded on strict liability for recovery on an injury that preceded the
improvement. 3
Mosk also noted that manufacturers of mass-produced goods would be
encouraged to market safer products if evidence of subsequent repairs
were admissible since the exclusionary rule would not shield them from
liability. In short, the majority concluded that it is in a mass producer's
own interest to improve defectively designed products; the exclusionary
rule neither prods the manufacturer into improving his product nor deters
him from doing so.
Justice Clark dissented. He argued that the term "culpable conduct"
includes any breach of a legal duty, and that a manufacturer acts
"culpably" when he places a defective product in the stream of commerce.69
Clark went on to add that the policy underlying the exclusionary rule is "as
applicable to products liability [i.e., strict products liability] actions as to
negligence actions, '70 but pointed out that, in his opinion, the primary
purpose of the exclusionary rule was to prevent the jury from giving
evidence of subsequent repairs unwarranted weight.71 Clark reasoned that
64. Id. at 118, 528 P.2d at 1150-51, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814-15.
65. Id. at 118, 528 P.2d at 1151, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
66. Id. at 118-19, 528 P.2d at 1151, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
67. Id. at 119, 528 P.2d at f151, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
68. Id. at 120, 528 P.2d at 1151-52, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16.
69. Id. at 124, 528 P.2d at 1154-55, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 818-19 (Clark, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 124, 528 P.2d at 1155, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
71. Id. at 125, 528 P.2d at 1155, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
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a jury was just as likely to misuse the information in a strict products
liability action as in an action sounding in negligence:
[C]hange in a product is frequently made for reasons unrelated to the
remedial nature of the change ...
Notwithstanding the lack of probative value, juries, in the heat of
negligence or products liability trials-learning only of a single change-may
conclude the change reflects an admission of negligence or defect and give
great and decisive weight to the perceived admission.72
Clark concluded that the exclusionary rule should therefore apply in strict
products liability cases.73
Justice Clark went on to note that the exclusionary rule alone would
not solve the problem of jury misuse of evidence since a jury could still
learn of remedial repairs under one of the exceptions to the rule.74 To
alleviate this problem, he suggested that trial judges apply a three-pronged
test in determining whether to admit evidence of subsequent remedial
measures under one or more of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule:
[T]he party introducing the evidence must persuasively satisfy the trial court
that the "issue on which it is offered is of substantial importance and is
actually, not merely formally in dispute, that the plaintiff cannot establish the
fact to be inferred conveniently by other proof, and consequently that the
need for the evidence outweighs the danger of its misuse.
III. Chart: A DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION
OF ITS HOLDING AND REASONING
A. Description
In Chart, the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
ruling that evidence of design changes in the 1964 and 1965 model Corvairs
was admissible against General Motors. Beyond this, however, it is
difficult to determine the extent or exact nature of the court's holding. The
majority opinion, written by Justice Day, pointed out that the case raised
an issue of first impression in Wisconsin,76 but did not say exactly what the
issue was. Moreover, it is not possible to infer a clear statement of the issue
from the result since the majority did not concisely state its holding.
At least two interpretations of the opinion are possible. On the one
hand, the majority may have concluded that the exclusionary rule
embodied in Wisconsin Rule 904.07 is not applicable to strict products
liability actions. On the other hand, it is at least equally plausible to read
the majority opinion to hold that the exclusionary rule does apply, but the
evidence of the change in the design of the Corvair was admissible under
the feasibility exception.
72. Id. at 125-26, 528 P.2d at 1156, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 126, 528 P.2d at 1156, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
75. Id. at 127, 528 P.2d at 1156, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 820 (footnote and citations omitted).
76. 80 Wis. 2d at 100, 258 N.W.2d at 683.
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Several arguments can be made in support of the first interpretation.
First, the majority discussed only the single policy it perceived as
underlying the exclusionary rule;77 it did not consider thejustifications for
the feasibility exception or any other exception.78 Second, the majority
ignored the argument-made by both General Motors79 and the dissenting
opinions°-that the feasibility exception comes into play only when the
feasibility of an alternative measure is controverted. 8 Both of these factors
suggest that the majority was not focusing on the feasibility exception-
that it simply decided that the exclusionary rule did not apply and that
evidence of subsequent repairs is generally admissible in strict products
liability actions.
Nonetheless, the second interpretation of the opinion seems to be the
more plausible. In concluding that the case presented a question of first
impression, the majority quoted a portion of the Judicial Council
Committee's Note to Rule 904.07: "The rule does not attempt to make the
determination whether remedial measures in product design are
admissible as 'feasibility of a precautionary measure' to prove that the
product was defective. The authorities are in conflict. 8 2 The language of
this comment rather clearly indicates that Rule 904.07 does apply td strict
products liability cases, although the feasibility exception may, at the same
time, carve out an exception. Thus, the majority probably held that
evidence of the design change made in the Corvair was excluded by the
exclusionary rule embodied in Rule 904.07 but admissible under the
feasibility exception.83 At the same time, given the tenor of the majority
opinion, it seems clear that the feasibility exception, as interpreted by the
court, is broad enough to permit admission of evidence of subsequent
modifications in any case, not just under the peculiar facts of Chart.
The majority's reasoning in support of its conclusion (whatever that
may have been) was cursory and cryptic:
Authorities are divided on the question whether evidence of subsequent
remedial changes is admissible in a products liability case such as this. We are
persuaded that such evidence is admissible. Evidence of subsequent remedial
measures is not without probative value. In the well-reasoned and persuasive
opinion of Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 117 Cal. Rptr.
812, 528 P.2d 1148 (1974), the California Supreme Court stated, "if the
changes occur closely in time they may well illustrate the feasibility of the
77. Id. at 101-02, 258 N.W.2d at 683-84.
78. One could argue, however, that it was unnecessary for the court to consider the policy
justifications for the feasibility exception in light of its determination that the policies behind the
exclusionary rule would not be offended by admission of evidence of subsequent modifications in strict
liability actions. See text accompanying notes 84-89 infra.
79. Brief for Appellant at 31-33.
80. 80 Wis. 2d at 120, 258 N.W.2d at 692 (Hansen, J., dissenting).
81. See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
82. 80 Wis. 2d at 100, 258 N.W.2d at 683 (citation omitted).
83. The interpretation is also supported by the dissents reading of the majority opinion. See id.
at 120, 258 N.W.2d at 692 (Hansen, J., dissenting).
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improvement at the time of the accident, one of the normal elements of the
negligence calculus.,
84
The majority went on to conclude that this analysis also applies in actions
that sound in strict products liability, arguing that admission of the
evidence would pose little threat to the policy behind the exclusionary rule
since (1) "in the products liability area, 'policy considerations are involved
which shift the emphasis from the defendant manufacturers' conduct to the
character of the product' ,85 and (2) the conduct of manufacturers of mass-
produced products is not guided by the evidentiary rule.86 The court's
argument on the latter point was bolstered by a reference to Ault v.
International Harvester,87 in which the court had pointed out that "[i]n the
products liability area, the exclusionary rule . . . does not affect the
primary conduct of the mass producer of goods, but serves merely as a
shield against potential liability."88 The majority concluded by noting that
"[e]conomic realities will set the course [of conduct of a manufacturer of
mass-produced goods] and these realities are that the sooner remedial
measures are taken, the less costly the defect will be to the manufacturer."89
Justice Connor Hansen wrote the dissent. He first pointed out that
evidence of design changes is admissible under the feasibility exception
only when the feasibility of an alternative design is contested, which
General Motors had not done.90 Justice Hansen then turned to the
majority's argument that the additional liability created by continuing
production of a defective product would force manufacturers to adopt
changes that make their products safer.9" He argued that admissibility will
tend to decrease the number of remedial measures taken because "by
making changes, [the manufacturer] increases the probability that he will
be held liable for injuries caused by those products already on the
market."92 Hansen also criticized the majority for resting its decision on
Ault, pointing out that the case was not relevant since California, unlike
Wisconsin, had liberalized the burden of proving that a product was
defective.93 He argued that, in Wisconsin, design modifications may be
determinative of whether an "unreasonable danger" existed (a crucial
84. Id. at 100, 258 N.W.2d at 683.
85. 80 Wis. 2d at 101, 258 N.W.2d at 683-84, quoting Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13
Cal.3d 113, 121, 528 P.2d 1148, 1152, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 816 (1974).
86. Id. at 101-02, 258 N.W.2d at 684.
87. 13 Cal. 3d 113, 120, 528 P.2d 1148, 1152, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 816 (1974).
88. 80 Wis. 2d at 101,258 N.W.2d at 684, quoting Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d
113, 121, 528 P.2d 1148, 1151, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 816 (1974) (citation omitted).
89. Id. at 102, 258 N.W.2d at 684.
90. Id. at 120, 258 N.W.2d at 692.
91. Id. at 120-21, 258 N.W.2d at 693. The majority's arguments are summarized in the text
accompanying notes 85-89 supra.
92. 80 Wis. 2d at 121, 258 N.W.2d at 693.
93. Id. At least one commentator has suggested that the test applied in California was essentially
no different from that used in any other state. See Wade, supra note 12, at 830.
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question), and can, therefore, be the difference between liability and no
liability.94 Thus, he concluded, "[t]he deterrent effect of admissibility
may . . . be substantial.19
5
B. Evaluation
1. The Reasoning of the Decision
The Chart decision is troubling in a number of respects. The
ambiguity of the majority's opinion is, of course, the shortcoming that is
likely to cause the most immediate concern, and the court will undoubtedly
be called upon to clarify its holding. But, even aside from this problem, the
majority's opinion is problematic in several important respects.
If the court held that the exclusionary rule was not applicable in strict
products liability actions-rather than that evidence of subsequent repairs
is admissible under the feasibility exception-its decision stands on
tenuous grounds. As was noted above,96 the Judicial Council Committee's
comments to Wisconsin Rule 904.07 clearly suggest that the exclusionary
rule applies to strict products liability actions as well as negligence actions.
Moreover, the "negligence" and "culpable conduct" language embodied in
Rule 904.07 is broad enough to encompass strict products liability. The
theory underlying strict products liability is very similar to that behind
negligence; 97 in fact, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has observed that
strict products liability is basically negligence per se.98 Similarly, as Justice
Clark observed in Ault,99 the phrase "culpable conduct" is broad enough to
cover any event that gives rise to liability.
The majority's determination that evidence of subsequent repairs is
relevant t0 is also problematic. The most pressing question-one that
almost leaps at the reader-is: "Relevant to prove what?" The court does
not specify whether the evidence is relevant to proof of a defect in the
product or whether it is relevant only to prove the feasibility of an
alternative measure. The court's failure to indicate which alternative it was
adopting was, of course, tied to the lack of a clear statement of the issue.
Nonetheless, the determination that evidence of subsequent remedial
measures is relevant to proof of a defect is a significant departure from the
traditional thinking that the evidence has either no probative value or
insufficient probative value to warrant admission.'0 '
94. 80 Wis. 2d at 121, 258 N.W.2d at 693.
95. Id.
96. See text accompanying notes 82-83 supra.
97. See text accompanying notes 107-13 infra.
98. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). See also Greiten v. LaDow, 70 Wis.
2d 589, 595, 235 N.W.2d 677, 681-82 (1975); Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247,259,201 N.W.2d 825,
831 (1972). Professor Twerski has severely criticized the court for using a negligence per se concept in
evaluating strict liability matters. Twerski, supra note 11, at 319-3 1.
99. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
100. 80 Wis. 2d at 100, 258 N.W.2d at 683.
101. See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra. The majority's conclusion about the relevancy of
1980]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the opinion is the majority's
policy discussion. The court acknowledged only one of the three policy
justifications commonly advanced to support the exclusionary rule, the
nondeterrence policy, 10 2 choosing to ignore both the jury misuse0 3 and
fundamental fairness10 4 arguments. Moreover, the reasoning advanced by
the majority to support its conclusion that admission of the evidence
would not deter improvements is questionable at best.
The court attempted to justify its reasoning by distinguishing between
products liability actions based upon strict liability and those based on
other theories, arguing that "in the strict products liability area, 'policy
considerations are involved which shift the emphasis from the defendant
manufacturers' conduct to the character of the product.' "105 This
argument is unpersuasive. As Dean Wade has pointed out:
It has been suggested that [the conventional section 402A test for imposing
strict products liability] amounts to characterizing the product rather than
the defendant's conduct. This is quite true, but it is easy to phrase the issue in
terms of conduct. Thus, assuming that the defendant had knowledge of the
condition of the product, would he then have been acting unreasonably in
placing the product on the market? This, it would seem, is another way of
posing the question of whether the product is reasonably safe or not. And it
may well be the most useful way of presenting it.10 6
Professor Dickerson, writing on the 1961 draft of section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, also observed:
It is, indeed, a gross exaggeration to put at opposite poles what represent only
modest differences in degree. On the one hand, even liability for negligence is
a kind of strict liability so far as it holds a person to a general standard of
conduct without regard to his peculiar idiosyncrasies. On the other hand,
safety measures to feasibility and defectiveness would certainly be tenable if Wisconsin followed the
"risk/ utility balancing" test of defectiveness that has been proposed by Deans Wade and Page Keeton.
See note 22 supra. Under the risk/utility balancing test, the feasibility of a precautionary measure is
one factor that the trier of fact must consider in making a determination whether a product is defective.
Id. But exactly how evidence of a precautionary measure is relevant to determine the defectiveness of a
product under the consumer expectations test, to which Wisconsin apparently adheres, see Note, Strict
Products Liability in Wisconsin, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 230, 235, remains a mystery.
102. See text accompanying notes 25-31 supra.
103. See text accompanying notes 18-24 supra. Counsel for General Motors raised the jury
misuse argument in its briefs, Brief for Appellant at 29; Reply Brief for Appellant at 8, but neither the
majority nor the dissent discussed the matter. It deserved at least a brief discussion since Justice Clark
based his dissent in Ault v. International Harvester Co. primarily on this point, see text accompanying
notes 70-72supra, and the Supreme Court of Washington upheld the exclusion of the evidenceforthe
same reason. Haysom v. Coleman Lantern Co., 89 Wash. 2d 474, 483, 573 P.2d 785, 791 (1978).
It is likely, however, that the majority would not have changed its holding even if it had considered
the jury misuse argument. The majority might have plausibly argued that this problem could be
effectively dealt with under rule 904.03, which provides a basis for excluding evidence when it presents
too great a danger of unfairly prejudicing, confusing, or misleading the jury. Judge Weinstein, in
discussing the exclusionary rule in the context of negligence actions, has suggested this course of
action. See J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 22, 407 [02], at 407-11.
104. See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
105. 80 Wis. 2d at 101, 258 N.W.2d at 684, quoting Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 111.
App. 3d 313, 218 N.E.2d 749 (1972). This argument seems to have originated in Sutkowski.
106. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5,15 (1965) (footnotes omitted).
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strict liability, despite its name, also deals with the defendant's conduct and
differs only in that it substitutes what has been called in other contexts a
"performance standard" for a standard that deals with specific conduct. In
short, this kind of strict liability differs from negligence only in eliminating
the necessity of proving specific acts of negligence. 0 7
The majority's "shift-in-emphasis" argument can be read as
suggesting that strict products liability is fundamentally different from
negligence, but this theory is also problematic. As the above-quoted
comments of Dean Wade and Professor Dickerson indicate, strict
products liability and negligence are actually quite similar.'0 8 Commen-
tators have pointed out, 0 9 and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has
agreed," 0 that strict products liability is akin to. negligence per se. In
addition, the tests for negligence and for strict products liability are not"'.
(or should not be)' 2 significantly different, and the types and problems of
proof under the two theories are substantially the same.'t 3 Moreover, the
court does not explain how refocusing the jury's attention on the product
(rather than on the manufacturer's conduct) will make a difference in the
way manufacturers approach the decision of whether to implement an
improved design. Arguably, manufacturers will still consider any
modification to be an admission of fault, and react accordingly.
The majority also attempted to justify its conclusion by distinguishing
between mass producers of goods and other producers."' 4 Relying on the
107. Dickerson, The Basis ofStrict Products Liability, 17 Bus. LAW. 157, 165-66(1961). See also
Recent Developments, 44 U. CINN. L. REy. 637, 640 (1975).
108. See Rheingold, Proof of Defect in Products Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. REV. 325,325-26,
326 n.5 (1971); cf. Note, The Coming ofAge of Strict Products Liability in Ohio, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 586,
618 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Strict Products Liability in Ohio].
109. See, e.g., Wade, supra note 106, at 14; Recent Cases,44 U. CINN. L. REv. 637, 639-40 (1975).
But see Twerski, supra note 11, at 319-21.
110. See Greiten v. LaDow, 70 Wis. 2d 589,595,235 N.W.2d 677,681(1975); Howes v. Hansen,
56 Wis. 2d 247, 259, 201 N.W.2d 825, 831 (1972); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55
(1967).
Ill. See Dickerson, supra note 107, at 165-66; Phelan & Foer, Problems of Proof in Defective
Design Litigation, 54 CHI. B. REC. 257,263 (1973); Rheingold, supra note 108; Wade, supra note 106,
at 13-15; cf. I R. HURSCH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODucTs LIABILITY § 4:12, at 671 (2d ed.
1974) ("a product is defective if it fails to meet the reasonable expectations of the user."); Dickerson,
Products Liability: How Good Does a Product Have to Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301, 305 (1967) (factors
defining legal defectiveness "are closely identified with the normal, reasonable expectation patterns of
buyers and sellers"). But see Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d at 118, 528 P.2d at 1150,
117 Cal. Rptr. at 814 n.2; Greiten v. LaDow, 70 Wis. 2d at 603-04,235 N.W.2d at 685-86 (Heffernan, J.,
concurring).
112. See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 12, at 37-38 ("A product is defective if it is unreasonably
dangerous as marketed. It is unreasonably dangerous if a reasonable person would conclude that the
magnitude of the scientifically perceivable danger as it is proved to be at the time of trial outweighed
the benefits of the way the product was so designed and marketed.") (emphasis in original); Wade,
supra note 12. See also Strict Products Liability in Ohio, supra note 108, at 613-19; Note, Strict
Products Liability in Wisconsin, 1977 WIs. L. REv. 227, 243-45.
113. Recent Developments, 50 N.C.L. REv. 417,424 (1972); Dickerson, supra note 107, at 166;
Rheingold, supra note 108; cf. Death Knell to the Exclusionary Rule, supra note 17, at 226. But see G.
LILLY, supra note 19, § 48, at 152; Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, supra note 17, at 845-46.
114. WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1389 (1966) (emphasis in original)
defines "mass produce" as "to produce or manufacture in quantity; esp.: to produce considerable
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reasoning of Ault, the majority concluded that the admission of evidence
of subsequent repairs would not prevent mass producers from making
changes in their products since the manufacturer of mass-produced goods
is guided by the " 'economic realities . . . that the sooner remedial
measures are taken, the less costly the defect will be. . . .' ,,5 In
attempting to defuse the argument that even mass producers might refrain
from implementing corrective measures because their motivation might be
misinterpreted, the court asserted that a manufacturer would not" 'forego
making improvements in its product and risk innumerable additional
lawsuits and the attendant adverse effect upon its public image, simply
because evidence of adoption of such improvement may be admitted in an
action founded on strict liability for recovery on an injury that preceded
the improvement.' ,,116
It is difficult to say whether the assertion is correct. The court did not
cite any empirical studies in support of the assertion, nor did it indicate
how it arrived at the conclusion that admission of evidence of subsequent
repairs would not deter manufacturers from making safety-related
changes. As a general rule, however, judgments concerning matters of this
type are better left to the legislature, which is able to assemble the data
necessary for making an informed decision." 7
Three points should be made, however, in defense of the majority's
position. First, most commentators have argued-again without empirical
support-that the factual assumptions on which the nondeterrence
argument is based are incorrect. 18 Second, the court is not alone in
drawing a distinction between mass producers and other producers;
numerous commentators have argued that there is a difference.19 Finally,
quantities of standardized commodities with the use of machine techniques-opposed to tailormake."
The terms of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) do not require that the defendant be a
mass producer, however. Instead, § 402A requires only that the defendant be "engaged in the business
of selling . .. a product [of the type that caused the injury]." Thus, it is not difficult to conceive of a
situation in which the defendant is liable under § 402A but is not a mass producer-for example, a
company that builds custom-designed automobiles. The applicability of Chart to situations of this type
is unclear. See text accompanying notes 127-28 infra.
115. 80 Wis. 2d at 102, 258 N.W.2d at 684.
116. 80 Wis. 2d at 101,258 N.W.2d at 684, quoting Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal.
3d 113, 120, 528 P.2d 1148, 1151, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812,816 (1974). In its Brief in Support of Motion for
Rehearing, General Motors pointed out that the California Citizens Commission on Tort Reform had
stated that "it is our view that permitting the admission of evidence showing design changes [occurring]
subsequent to a product-related injury is quite likely, over the full range of cases, to impede rather than
promote progress toward safer and more reliable products." Appellant's Brief in Support of Motion
for Rehearing at 1, citing CALIFORNIA CITIZENS COMMITTEE ON TORT REFORM, RIGHTING THE
LIABILITY BALANCE 165 (Sept. 1977). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also has observed
that "[s]ome manufacturers might still decide that the risk of increased liability arising from the
admission of subsequent repairs or warnings would so outweigh the risks posed by adherence to the
status quo that they would opt for the latter." Smyth v. Upjohn Co., 529 F.2d 803,805 (2d Cir. 1975).
117. See Recent Developments, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 288, 292.
118. See text accompanying notes 26-31 supra.
119. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 29, at 164-65; Davis, supra note 52, at 798-99;
Lloyd, supra note 52, at 409-10; Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, supra note 17, at 848-50; Recent
Developments, 44 U. CINN. L. REV. 637, 641 (1975). But see Death Knell to the Exclusionary Rule,
supra note 17, at 223-24; Recent Developments, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 288, 292.
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in Wisconsin the supreme court is specifically empowered by statute to
amend the Rules of Evidence,12 0 and this power implies that the court, as
well as the legislature, is capable of making policy-oriented judgments in
this area.
If, as is possible, 121 the majority's opinion was based on the feasibility
exception, there is one other glaring omission in the court's discussion: the
absence of any consideration of the policy justifications that underlie the
feasibility exception. Of course, one could argue that if the court relied
upon the feasibility exception, it also meant to hold that feasibility was
always at issue in products liability actions based on strict liability. 122 This
interpretation would be consistent with the court's broad policy analysis.
However, if that was indeed what the court intended (which is likely),'123 it
was a round-about, overly complex means of arriving at a result that could
have been reached just as easily by excepting strict products liability
actions from the scope of the exclusionary rule. Given the court's power to
amend the Rules of Evidence124 and the problematic arguments for and
effects of the feasibility exception, 21 this course of action would clearly
have been preferable.
126
2. Limitations on Admission
As was noted above, the majority rationalized the admission of
evidence of subsequent repairs by drawing a distinction between strict
products liability and negligence actions and between mass producers and
other producers. 127 The majority did not, however, indicate whether either
(or both) of these distinctions established limits on the admission of
evidence of remedial conduct. Accordingly, three interpretations of Chart
are possible: (1) the evidence is admissible only when the action is brought
against a mass-producer on a strict products liability theory; (2) the
evidence is admissible only when the action is brought on a strict products
liability theory, regardless of whether the defendant is a mass producer; or
(3) the evidence is admissible when the action is brought against a mass
producer, regardless of the theory of recovery. Thus, the stage is set for a
battle over the scope of the opinion. Moreover, since the majority opinion
did not address the extent to which evidence of subsequent repairs can be
120. See note 4 supra.
121. See text accompanying notes 77-83 supra.
122. See id.
123. See text following note 83 supra.
124. See note 4 supra.
125. See text accompanying notes 41-44 supra.
126. One could argue that the court retained the exclusionary rule and relied on the feasibility
exception because it hoped trial courts would be more careful in considering whether to admit evidence
under an exception to a broad, general rule of exclusion. However, it is questionable if this
consideration warrants the confusion created by such an approach.
127. See text accompanying notes 105-17 supra.
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excluded under Wisconsin Rule of Evidence 904.03,128 it is likely that the
court will be called upon to establish some standards in this area.
IV. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The decision to admit or exclude evidence of subsequent remedial
measures in a products liability action turns on a balancing of two sets of
competing values. One side of the analysis focuses on the values ostensibly
promoted by the exclusion of evidence of this nature-namely, that
exclusion (1) encourages (or at least does not discourage) safety measures,
(2) prevents a jury from giving unwarranted weight to the fact that a repair
was made, and (3) maintains the appearance of fair treatment for those
who (as they should) implement changes. The other side of the analysis
focuses on the costs of exclusion: (1) relevant evidence is kept from the trier
of fact, (2) a heavier burden is placed upon the party seeking to establish
that the defendant was negligent or that a defect existed, and (3) admission
of the evidence for a limited purpose under an exception to the general rule
tends to confuse the jury.
To a great extent, the outcome of this weighing of values depends
upon empirical data that is not yet available. For example, no one has been
able to say what impact evidence of subsequent remedial measures has
upon the mind of a juror or whether admission of the evidence would
adversely affect a manufacturer's decision to implement a safety measure.
Given the current lack of data, what should the courts do? The best
course of action is probably to abandon the exclusionary rule on a
tentative basis-at least until the necessary empirical data become
available. Most commentators have recommended that the rule be
abolished, 129 and the trend in the courts is to follow this suggestion. 30 The
arguments advanced by the commentators"3  and the courts'3 2 in support
of this position seem to be quite persuasive. At the very least, the courts
should abandon the rule in all actions brought against mass-producers.
Many of the commentators133 and courts134 that have recommended the
128. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 904.03 (West 1973) permits courts to exclude relevant evidence if "its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." Unlike FED. R. OF EVID. 407, the Notes to the Wisconsin Rules do not specify
whether this rule applies to the admission of evidence under the feasibility exception to Rule 904.07,
Wis. Stat. ANN. § 904.07 (West 1975). It would seem that Rule 904.03 should be applicable, however.
See D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 19, § 165, at 257; Field, supra note 27, at 218; Death Knell
to the Exclusionary Rule, supra note 17, at 227.
129. See note 52 supra.
130. See note 51 supra.
131. See generally the discussion in Part I supra.
132. See generally the discussion in Parts I and II supra.
133. See note 119 supra.
134. See Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788 (8th Cir. 1977); Aultv.
International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974); Barry v.
Manglass, 55 A.D.2d 1,389 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1976); Shaffer v. Honeywell, Inc., 249 N.W.2d 251 (S.D.
1976). But see Smyth v. Upjohn, 529 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1975) (diversity case applying New York law);
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abandonment of the rule have based their arguments at least in part on the
distinction between mass-producers and other producers. The same
evidentiary rule should be applied in both negligence and strict products
liability actions, however, since the two theories and the underlying
problems of proof are substantially the same.
This does not mean that all evidence of subsequent repairs should be
admitted. Since the impact on a jury of admitting such evidence is not
clear, trial courts probably should apply Justice Clark's test 135 to exclude
evidence that, under the circumstances, would be unduly prejudicial,
cumulative, or confusing.
SUMMARY
Chart is a beginning toward formulating an answer to what is
obviously a difficult question. The decision produces more questions than
answers, however. While Chart clearly holds that evidence of subsequent
remedial measures is admissible under some circumstances in some
products liability actions, it does not define the limits of admissibility or
even indicate whether there are any limits. This ambiguity is a serious flaw.
Litigants are left to guess whether evidence of remedial conduct will be
admitted in all products liability cases, only in actions brought on certain
theories of recovery or against certain defendants, only when feasibility is
in issue, or only when the evidence is not unduly prejudicial, cumulative, or
confusing. In short, Chart charted the way for admission of the evidence,
but not at all well. It is hoped that this article will help practitioners and
courts understand this significant but confusing case.
Thomas D. Sykes
Phillips v. J.L. Hudson Co., 79 Mich. App. 425, 263 N.W.2d 3 (1977); Haysom v. Coleman Lantern
Co., 89 Wash. 2d 474, 573 P.2d 785 (1978).
135. See text accompanying notes 74-75 supra.
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